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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by Thomas D. Chambers ("Tom") and a cross-
appeal by Erin Jo Chambers ("Erin") from portions of an order 
entered by the trial court following remand of this marital 
dissolution action in a prior appeal, Case No. 900631-CA. This 
Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 79-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1990), which governs review of 
domestic relations matters. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
• After the trial court acknowledged that it had 
erred by awarding alimony which exceeded 
Erin's living expense by $108,000, did it err 
again by refusing to order that Tom be reim-
bursed for the overpayment? 
• Did the trial court err by reversing its 
original order terminating spousal support 
after six years, based on assumptions about 
Erin's investment base and rate of return 
which were outside the evidence in the record? 
• After finding on remand that Erin had the 
financial means to pay her own attorney, did 
the trial court err by ordering Tom to pay a 
substantial portion of Erin's attorneys' fees, 
anyway? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
While a trial court has broad discretion to set alimony and 
award attorneys' fees in marital dissolution actions, that discre-
tion is not unlimited. Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871# 872 (Utah 
1979). It must be exercised "within the bounds and under the 
standards" set by the high courts of this state, and the decision 
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must be supported "with adequate findings and conclusions." Davis 
v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988). In addition, the 
appellate court can disturb an award where serious inequity is 
manifest from the findings and conclusions. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
Failure to apply the correct legal factors in analyzing the 
parties' circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. Naranio 
v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988). The factors 
governing the determination of alimony are the financial condition 
and needs of the receiving spouse; the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income; and the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. See Schindler v. Schindler, 
776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989). The factors governing the 
decision to award attorneys' fees and the amount of such fees are 
the reasonableness of the requested fees; the financial need of the 
receiving spouse; and the ability of the other spouse to pay. Bell 
v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Rasband v. 
Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988)). 
There is another general standard which applies in the 
procedural context of this case. Where (as here) an action has 
been remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate 
court's opinion, the trial court must carefully heed the instruc-
tions contained in the mandate. Vinton Eppsco Inc. v. Showe Homes. 
Inc.f 97 N.M. 225, 638 P.2d 1070, 1071 (N.M. 1981); In re Adoption 
of BBC, 849 P.2d 769, 722 (Wyo. 1993); Bryfoale v. Arizona Deo't of 
2 
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deviation is reversible error. 
In sum, a domestic relations order on remand will be reversed, 
if there is a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law, if the 
evidence clearly preponderates against a finding of fact, if there 
is a serious inequity which must be rectified, or if there is a 
departure from the appellate mandate. English v. English. 565 P.2d 
409, 410 (Utah 1977)• 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order on Remand and related Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated March 2, 1994 which, among 
other things, denied Defendant/Appellants Motion for Reconsidera-
tion/Rehearing of the Memorandum Decision dated July 12, 1993 and 
Supplemental Memorandum dated November 19, 1993. R.O.A. 921-932.l 
A copy of the Order on Remand is included in Appendix 1 to 
Appellant's Brief. 
On November 30, 1990, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County entered a Decree of 
Divorce, together with related Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
*The following conventions are adopted for citations to the 
record: 
••R.O.A." refers to the pertinent page of the Record on Appeal filed 
June 9, 1994. 
"Tr." refers to the reporter's official transcripts of trial 
proceedings in the case below, by volume and page. 
"Exh." refers to the numbered trial exhibits in the case below. 
"Decree" refers to the Decree of Divorce entered November 30, 1990 
by Hon. Stanton M. Taylor (R.O.A. 398-412). 
"Findings of Fact" refers to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law entered November 30, 1990 by Hon. Stanton M. Taylor (R.O.A. 
378-397). 
"Opinion" and "Op." refer to the Opinion filed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals on October 21, 1992, by page number. 
"Hr." refers to the reporter's official transcripts of the hearing 
on remand on June 7, 1993, and hearing on Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration/Rehearing on February 28, 1994, by date and page. 
"Order on Remand" refers to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on Remand entered March 2, 1994 by Hon. Stanton M. 
Taylor (R.O.A. 921-932). 
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Law. R.O.A. 378-397, 398-412. Both parties appealed. R.O.A. 415, 
426. 
On October 21, 1992, this Court reversed and remanded certain 
rulings for further findings of fact, including the award of 
alimony to Erin and the partial reimbursement of attorneys' fees by 
Tom. Op. at 2-5.2 
On remand, the trial court acknowledged that it had made some 
analytical errors. As pointed out by this Court, the trial court 
admitted that it had failed to consider Erin's employability and 
that it had improperly lumped the children's expenses into the 
computation of Erin's living expense need. See Op. at 3 & 4 n.l. 
Because of this miscalculation, the trial court determined that 
Erin had been awarded and had already received $108,000 more than 
she was entitled to, but the trial court refused to order Erin to 
return these overpayments to Tom. R.O.A. 731-737, 766-767. 
But that was just the beginning. Undertaking its own 
financial analysis of Erin's available investment base and 
anticipated rate of return, in complete disregard of the evidence 
at trial, the trial court increased the duration of the alimony 
payments from six (6) years to an indefinite period of time. Id. 
Despite making an express finding that Erin had sufficient 
financial means to pay her own attorneys, the trial court also 
ordered that Tom reimburse her a total of $22,500. Id. 
^his Court also affirmed the trial court's conclusion that 
Tom's future employment contract payments were not marital property 
and reversed the trial court's division of Tom's retirement 
benefits. Op. at 5-7. Those matters are no longer before this 
Court. 
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Tom filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Rehearing of the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision (dated July 12, 1993) and Supplemental 
Memorandum (dated November 19, 1993). R.O.A. 731-737, 766-767, 
859-883. The Motion was denied, and the trial court entered its 
final Order on Remand on March 2, 1994. R.O.A. 921-932. Tom then 
filed a notice of appeal, and Erin filed a notice of cross-appeal. 
R.O.A. 955, 984. 
The issues presented in this appeal are limited to those 
portions of the Order on Remand: (1) denying reimbursement of past 
overpayments of alimony; (2) perpetuating the alimony award beyond 
six years; and (3) awarding attorneys' fees on a finding of no 
financial need. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on February 12, 1980 and divorced on 
November 30, 1990. Tr. II: 2, 5; R.O.A. 398-412. During virtually 
the entire ten-year marriage, Tom pursued a career as a profes-
sional basketball player. Tr. II: 24; Tr. IV: 86; Plaintiff's Exh. 
2. The parties and their three minor children enjoyed a reasonably 
comfortable lifestyle during the marriage, and they accumulated 
substantial assets. Tr. IV: 109-111; Defendant's Exh. 25. 
Alimony 
In order to maintain a standard of living reasonably similar 
to that enjoyed during marriage, Erin testified at trial that she 
would require a net income of approximately $10,000 per month for 
herself and for the children who primarily reside with her. Tr. 
II: 88-89, 91-92, 105-107; see also Plaintiff's Exh. 11. On the 
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fourth day of trial, the parties entered into a stipulation for 
division of their real and personal property. Tr. IV: 2-3; R.O.A. 
SM5-386. The trial court fixed Tom's child support obligation at 
$4,500 per month ($1,500 per child), again by stipulation. R.O.A. 
383-384, 403. Although recognizing that Erin was receiving 
substantial income-producing assets, the trial court awarded her 
$10,000 per month alimony in addition to the child support, to be 
reduced to $5,000 per month after three years, and to terminate 
after six years. R.O.A. 382-383, 402-403. 
Both parties appealed the alimony award. R.O.A. 415, 426. 
This Court found that the trial court's findings of fact regarding 
alimony were insufficient. Op. at 3-4. Contrary to the applicable 
law, the trial court's findings did not address Erin's level of 
education, health, and other matters concerning her immediate or 
eventual employability. 1^. In addition, the trial court had 
"double-counted" the children's expenses, including them in both 
the $4,500 monthly child support and in the $10,000 monthly alimony 
award. Id. at 4. The Court reversed the alimony award and 
remanded for further findings. Id. 
On remand, after considering Erin's employability and treating 
her living expense need as a separate issue, the trial court found 
that the alimony award for the first thr#e years should only have 
been $7,000 per month, instead of $10,000 per month. R.O.A. 732, 
923-924. However, by the time it corrected its findings, the first 
three years had already passed, and $108,000 in overpayments had 
already been made. Even though this Court had described the 
situation as "plainly inequitable," Op. at 4 n.l, the trial court 
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amended its findings without curing the inequity. It ordered that 
Erin was not required to reimburse the substantial excess sum which 
she had received. R.O.A. 766-767, 924-925. 
The trial court also ordered that the alimony would not 
terminate after six years, as originally ordered, but would 
continue until Erin's death or remarriage. R.O.A. 733-734, 926-
927. The trial court based its decision primarily on its indepen-
dent determination that Erin's available investment base was 
somehow inferior to Tom's available investment base — ostensibly 
because Erin's property settlement included notes receivable from 
her own family which the judge deemed "probably uncollectible" and 
because Tom's professional basketball career had lasted longer than 
the judge expected. R.O.A. 733-734, 736, 926-927, 929. The trial 
court also hypothesized that the anticipated rate of return was 
probably lower than was proven at trial, although no additional 
economic evidence was introduced on remand. Id. 
Attorneys'Fees 
Months before trial, the parties stipulated that Tom would 
advance Erin $12,500.00 for attorneys' fees, subject to adjustment 
at the time of the final decree and distribution. R.O.A. 98, 393-
394. Erin's trial counsel presented an affidavit reciting that 
$58,000.00 had or would be incurred by Erin for legal services. 
Tr. II: 160-162; Plaintiff's Exh. 17. The trial court found that 
enough money was being distributed to permit each party to pay his 
or her own attorneys' fees, but concluded that Tom should still pay 
an additional $10,000.00 "in view of the sums of money that Mr. 
8 
Chambers is going to be making over the next few years." R.O.A. 
393-394, 411. 
Both parties appealed the trial court's award of attorneys' 
fees to Erin. R.O.A. 415# 426. This Court found that the award 
was an abuse of discretion, because the trial court did not address 
the reasonableness of the fees and stopped short of finding that 
each party would have the means to pay their own fees. Op. at 5. 
The Court reversed the award and remanded the issue for consider-
ation under the standards announced in Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 
493 (Utah App. 1991). Id. 
On remandf the trial court reviewed the record and made a 
determination that the attorneys' fees requested by Erin were "not 
unreasonable" and that Tom had the ability to pay Erin's attorneys' 
fees. R.O.A. 734, 927-928. But, in addition, the trial court made 
the explicit finding that "filt is clear with the distribution of 
almost a million and a half dollars in assets, that fErinl could 
pay her own attorney." R.O.A. 735-736, 921, 930 (emphasis added). 
Despite this explicit finding, the trial court reaffirmed its award 
of attorneys' fees, again theorizing that it would be unfair to 
"erode" Erin's investment base even to this extent, in light of the 
supposedly uncollectible notes receivable, taxes, and other 
expenses. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court previously held that it was "plainly inequitable" 
that the children's expenses (which were the basis for a separate 
child support award) were also included in Erin's living expense 
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need, Op. at 4 n.l, and it directed the trial court to reconsider 
the amount of the alimony award accordingly. On remand, the trial 
court separately computed Erin's monthly expenses and determined 
that spousal support should have been set at $7,000 per month, 
instead of $10,000 per month. Although the trial court acknowl-
edged that it had made a mistake, it nevertheless concluded that 
Erin did not have to reimburse the substantial overpayments which 
she had already received before the mistake was corrected. The 
trial court's latest ruling is even more "plainly inequitable" than 
the last one! 
The trial court's conclusion was based on its belief that 
Erin's investment base had already been decreased by supposedly 
uncollectible notes receivable from her family included in the 
stipulated property distribution, and that her investment base 
would be further undermined if she had to repay the overpayments of 
alimony. The trial court erred because: (1) the overpayments were 
Tom's separate property which the trial court had no power to 
distribute to Erin post-decree; (2) there was no evidence that the 
notes receivables were uncollectible or that Erin's investment base 
would be undermined if she reimbursed Tom for the overpayments; and 
(3) the spirit of this Court's mandate was ignored. 
On remand, the trial court also reversed its original order 
that alimony payments would terminate after six years, and ordered 
instead that the obligation would continue indefinitely until 
Erin's death or remarriage. Contrary to the evidence in the 
record, the trial court postulated that Erin's investment base was 
somehow less reliable than Tom's and that Erin could expect a four 
10 
percent (4%) return, instead of the eight percent (8%) return 
acknowledged at trial. The trial court erred because: (1) it 
failed to comply with this Court's mandate for "further explana-
tion" of the original decision; and (2) it based its new decision 
on evidence outside the record. 
Finally, on remand, the trial court reaffirmed its original 
decision to award Erin partial reimbursement of her attorneys' 
fees. The trial court predicated its decision on its belief that 
taxes, the notes receivable, court costs, witness fees, and 
attorneys' fees must have made "substantial inroads" into Erin's 
investment base. The trial court erred because: (1) its assump-
tion about the erosion of Erin's investment base was not supported 
by the evidence; and (2) an award of attorneys' fees is contrary to 
law when there was an explicit finding that Erin "could pay her own 
attorney" in light of her receipt of assets valued at $1.5 million. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Decision that Erin is Not Required to 
Reimburse Tom for Overpayments of Alimony is Contrary to the 
Law, the Facts and the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this Case. 
At trial, Erin testified that she would require a net income 
of approximately $10,000 per month for herself and the parties' 
three minor children in order to maintain a standard of living 
reasonably similar to that enjoyed during marriage. Tr. II: 88-89, 
91-92, 105-107; Plaintiff's Exh. 11. By stipulation between the 
parties, Tom's child support obligation was fixed at $4,500 per 
month ($1,500 per child). R.O.A. 383-384, 403. The trial court 
awarded Erin alimony of $10,000 per month for the first three years 
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in addition to the child support, to be reduced to $5,000 per month 
for the next three years, after which alimony would terminate. 
R.O.A. 382-383, 402. 
The trial court's finding with respect to alimony was as 
follows: 
The plaintiff [Mrs. Chambers] presented to the court 
in her "Exhibit 11," a request and demonstrated need for 
alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month with an 
additional $4,000.00 per month being requested by 
plaintiff as necessary to pay the income taxes on the 
$10,000.00 per month. Plaintiff testified that many of 
the base expenses were also expenses that would apply to 
the children as well as herself. Defendant [Mr. Cham-
bers] contends that plaintiff is not entitled to any 
award of alimony based upon the substantial assets she is 
receiving. Considering defendant's "Exhibit 25," the 
court finds that the plaintiff has a need to maintain a 
standard of living somewhat close to what the parties 
maintained in the past. The court further determines 
that the defendant has the ability to pay and plaintiff 
should be awarded alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per 
month, which should continue for three (3) years. 
Thereafter, plaintiff should be paid alimony in the sum 
of $5,000.00 per month for an additional three (3) years 
after which alimony will terminate. The reason that the 
alimony should decline after three (3) years and termi-
nate after six (6) years, is based upon the finding by 
the court that the plaintiff will earn substantial income 
from assets that have been awarded to her and which will, 
by the time three (3) years have passed, be substantially 
in her possession or under her control and she will be 
able to invest these assets in such a way as to produce 
income for her own support. 
R.O.A. 382-383. Both parties appealed the alimony award. R.O.A. 
415, 426. 
This Court held that the trial court's finding was insuffi-
cient under the three-prong test announced in Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). Op. at 3. In particular, 
the trial court failed to address Erin's level of education, health 
12 
and other matters concerning her immediate or eventual employabil-
ity. !£. In addition, this Court held that: 
Additionally, upon remand the district court must 
reconsider its apparent inclusion of the children's 
expenses in Mrs. Chambers' alimony award. In its 
findings, the court acknowledges that many of the 
expenses listed in Mrs. Chambers' request for $10,000 per 
month alimony were expenses that applied to the children. 
In view of the district court's award of $4,500 per month 
in child support, it is plainly inequitable that Mr. 
Chamber's alimony payment includes the children's 
expenses. 
Op. at 4 n.l (emphasis added). This Court reversed and remanded 
the trial court's award of alimony for further findings consistent 
with the opinion. Id. 
On remand, the trial court found that although Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 11 correctly reflected Erin and the children's needs at 
about $10,000 per month, Exhibit 11 failed to include Erin's need 
for health and accident insurance and money to offset the tax 
liability on the alimony. R.O.A. 732, 923-924. In recalculating 
the alimony, the trial court added insurance and taxes to the 
expenses listed on Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, then deducted the child 
support, and concluded that Erin "has need of about $7,000 [per 
month] to maintain her prior standard of living." Id. This raised 
the question of how to deal with the overpayments between November 
1990 and October, 1993, totalling $108,000. 
Although thm trial court conceded both the miscalculation and 
the overpayments. It nevertheless held that Erin would not have to 
return Tom's monsy: 
To require the Plaintiff to repay those overpayments 
would seriously affect her ability to maintain her 
standard of living. It would undermine further her 
investment base to a very serious extent. In addition, 
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in dividing the estate, we had awarded to her an obliga-
tion of her family which at this point seems unlikely to 
be collected. The decision to loan the money to the 
plaintiff's brother [sic] appears to have been a joint 
decision. The diminution of her estate by both the loan 
and repayment of alimony based upon the court's mistake, 
somehow seems unfair. The Court accordingly declines to 
order repayment based upon the equities of property 
division, earning ability, etc. 
R.O.A. 766-767; see also R.O.A. 924-925. 
There is no legal, factual, or equitable justification for the 
trial court's refusal to order reimbursement to Tom of the 
overpayment of alimony. Simply stated, the overpayments (and any 
interest thereon) are Tom's post-decree separate property. Erin 
has no legal claim to such property (as this Court made clear in 
the section of its opinion concerning future earnings), and the 
trial court has no power to distribute such property to Erin. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980); see also 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982). The trial 
court exceeded its jurisdiction when it effectively declared that 
Erin could keep Tom's money to remedy perceived imbalances in the 
parties' potential investment income. 
The trial court refused to order Erin to repay the overpay-
ments because it believed that: (1) debt payable by Erin's family, 
awarded Erin in the property distribution, "seems unlikely to be 
collected" and thereby reduces her investment base; (2) restoring 
the overpayments to Tom would "undermine further her investment 
base"; and (3) to diminish "her estate by both the [family 
receivables] and repayment of alimony based upon the court's 
mistake, somehow seems unfair." R.O.A. 766-767, 924-925. These 
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beliefs do not confer legal authority on the trial court to 
distribute Tom's post-decree earnings to Erin. 
Moreover, the trial court's beliefs are absolutely without 
factual support in the record. The debt the trial court referred 
to was actually two loans made to Erin's family — a $100,000 loan 
to her father and a $6,000 loan to her sister and brother-in-law. 
Tr. II: 28-30; Tr. Ill: 14-15. The parties stipulated at trial 
that those notes receivable would be awarded to Erin. Tr. IV: 2, 
47-48. There is no evidence in the trial record that these debts 
are uncollectible! See Tr. I: 65, 67; Tr. II: 28-30, 81-82; Tr. 
Ill: 14-15, 140-142; Tr. IV: 157-158. In fact, there was evidence 
before the trial court that Erin's sister and brother-in-law had 
already begun repaying their loan and that Erin's father intended 
to repay his loan. Tr. I: 67; Tr. II: 29-30; Tr. IV: 157-158. 
The first time that anyone even suggested that the debts were 
uncollectible appeared in Plaintiff's Remand Response Memorandum, 
where Erin's current attorney (who did not represent her at trial) 
off-handedly remarked that "[o]n the loan receivables, $106,000.00 
is an obligation owed from Erin's family which has not been paid 
and in all probably [sic] will not be. She does not want to sue 
family members." R.O.A. 685. This comment is not evidence. It 
was not supported by any citation to the record at trial. 
Furthermore, even if he did not claim that the debts are uncollect-
ible, but simply that Erin now chooses not to collect them. The 
redistribution of marital property based on Erin's change of heart 
was not before the trial court. 
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The trial court also believed that repayment of the alimony 
would "seriously affect [Erin's] ability to maintain her standard 
of living" or "undermine . . . her investment base to a very 
serious extent." R.O.A. 766-767. This is rank speculation. 
Simple logic supports the opposite conclusion: Erin's standard of 
living and investment base were quite obviously increased during 
the period of time when she received sums in excess of her living 
expense need. She had $3,000 per month in excess disposable 
income, which she either invested or otherwise used to achieve a 
standard of living higher than she enjoyed during the parties' 
marriage. 
The trial court had already determined that, after the first 
three years, Erin would be earning "substantial income" from the 
investment of assets awarded her (i.e., her investment base) so as 
to justify first a reduction in and eventually a termination of 
alimony. R.O.A. 382-383. Erin's 1993 investment base should have 
been $1,497,578.00, comprised of two installments of Tom's 1989-
1990 season income, certain annuities, equalization payments from 
Tom, checking accounts, loan receivables, tax exempt municipal 
bonds, and three payments from the Seattle Supersonics. See 
discussion infra, pp. 19-21. Because of the trial court's error, 
she received another $108,000, which the trial court let her keep. 
Ordering repayment would not have reduced Erin's investment base or 
lowered her standard of living, because the overpayments should 
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never have been made available to her to invest or spend in the 
first place.3 
The trial court's refusal to order a refund is, in the words 
of this Court, Mplainly inequitable.M Op. at 4 n.l. Over a three-
year period, Erin received $108,000 more than she was entitled to 
receive. Thanks to this Court, the trial court admitted that its 
initial alimony analysis was flawed, but it still refuses to 
correct the mistake. In order to effectuate both the letter and 
the spirit of its previous mandate, this Court must now specific-
ally direct the trial court to order Erin to refund the overpay-
ments of alimony with interest at the legal rate. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Reversing its Original Decree that 
Alimony Would Terminate After Six Years. 
In the original Decree, the trial court stated that, after the 
first three years, alimony would be reduced and ultimately 
eliminated because Erin's own investment income would then be 
sufficient to meet her living expense need. R.O.A. 382. In the 
prior appeal, this Court held that the trial court's findings were 
not specific enough: 
[W]ithout further explanation, the court's blanket 
reference to [Erin's] "substantial income from assets 
that have been awarded to her11 is inadequate to justify 
the court's reduction of alimony. Without more, we 
cannot determine whether such reduction constituted an 
abuse of discretion. 
Op. at 3-4. Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the award of 
alimony ,ffor further findings." Id. at 4. 
3
 Tom did not insist that the $108,000 plus interest had to 
be re-paid immediately in a lump sum. The trial court could have 
considered the possibility of ordering reimbursement in installment 
payments. 
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On remand, taking into consideration Erin's ability to earn 
income, the return on her investment base, and the child support, 
the trial court determined that after the first three years alimony 
should be reduced to $3,000 per month. R.O.A. 733, 926. However, 
the trial court also ordered that the alimony would thereafter 
continue indefinitely! The trial court stated: 
The Plaintiff received as her share of the property 
division $1,479,578. Realistically it would not be fair 
to consider that figure as her investment base. There 
are obviously attorneys' fees and costs of the proceeding 
as well as taxes to pay, etc. She has also requested 
that we deduct from her investment base her purchase of 
a home and the debt by her family. It would not be 
appropriate to allow the Plaintiff to remove the home 
from her investment base and also allow her to claim rent 
expense of over $1,000 per month. 
Figuring a 4% return on her investment base, the 
imputed income of $736, and the child support, the 
alimony award should be reduced at the end of three years 
to $3,000 per month. 
I had previously ordered termination of alimony at 
the end of [six] years. That decision was based on the 
fact that when the Defendant is through with basketball 
his ability to produce income is frankly no better than 
Plaintiff's. His present earning ability is based 
strictly upon his status as a professional athlete. In 
retrospect that is not entirely correct, for it fails to 
consider the income he will earn in the meantime. His 
investment base, considering his interim income, should 
exceed hers by several times, giving him by far a 
superior ability to provide on-going assistance. 
The alimony then should not terminate except upon 
the occurrence of remarriage, death, etc. 
I have referred above to the debt to her family, 
which is probably not collectable. There was some 
dispute at trial about whose idea the loan was and to 
whom it should be assigned. I awarded it to Plaintiff 
because it was to her family and because I believed that 
she had some influence in the decision process. There is 
likewise no question that the Defendant also had some 
responsibility for that decision. While it is not my 
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intent to revisit that issue, I think it appropriate to 
point out that the reduction in her investment base was 
contributed to by that obligation and that is an equita-
ble factor considered by the court. 
R.O.A. 733-734, 736 (emphasis added); see also R.O.A. 926-927, 929. 
The trial court exceeded the mandate of this Court by 
declaring that alimony would continue beyond the six-year rehabili-
tation period, without any evidentiary basis for reversing itself. 
In the previous appeal, this Court held that the trial court could 
not support a reduction in alimony with a blanket statement that 
Erin would be receiving substantial income from assets awarded to 
her. Op. at 3. It remanded so that the Court could supplement its 
order with "further explanation" and detailed findings drawn from 
the evidence in the record. The record was replete with this kind 
of evidence, but the trial court chose to ignore it. Instead, it 
went outside the record and indulged in guesswork about Erin's 
past, present and future financial condition. This was an abuse of 
discretion. 
It is well settled that the duty of a lower court on remand is 
to comply with the mandate of the higher court, obeying all 
directions without deviation. Vinton EPPSCO Inc. v. Showe Homes. 
Inc. . 97 N.M. 225, 638 P.2d 1070, 1071 (N.M. 1981). Stated 
differently, the trial court's jurisdiction on remand is circum-
scribed by the appellate opinion. Id.; see also In re Adoption of 
BBC. 849 P.2d 769, 772 (Wyo. 1993); Brvfoale v. Arizona Dept. of 
Corrections, 153 Ariz. 598, 739 P.2d 819, 821 (App. 1987). 
On remand in this case, the trial court should simply have 
supplemented the previous findings with specific evidentiary 
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support for the reduction and elimination of alimony, as ordered by 
this Court in 1992. The record shows that, by stipulation of the 
parties, Erin was awarded the following cash or cash equivalent 
assets: 
Last two installments of Tom's 
1989-1990 season income $ 80,000.00 
Certain Annuities $420,000.00 
Equalization Payments from Tom $377,892.00 
Checking Accounts and Loan Receivables $107,802.00 
Tax Exempt Municipal Bonds $ 26,384.00 
Seattle Supersonics February 1991 Payment $150,000.00 
Seattle Supersonics February 1992 Payment $152,500.00 
Seattle Supersonics February 1993 Payment $165.000.00 
TOTAL: $1.497.578.00 
Tr. IV 2-3, 35-49; R.O.A. 385-393, 405-410. 
At trial, Dennis Abold, a Certified Public Accountant, 
calculated what the after-tax cash flow would be from the invest-
ment of the assets awarded to Erin, based on a reasonable interest 
rate of eight percent (8%) per annum and a net tax effect of 
thirty-five percent (35%). Tr. Ill: 93-96.4 Mr. Abold testified 
that the net income to Erin from the assets would range from 
$2,807.00 per month in 1990, all the way up to $4,724.00 per month 
in 1993 and beyond. Id. He further testified that when the 
monthly child support of $4,500.00 is added in, the total after-tax 
4Mr. Abold based his calculations on a proposed property 
division which closely approximated the amount of cash and cash 
equivalent assets actually awarded to Erin. See Tr. Ill: 89-96; 
R.O.A. 405-410. 
20 
income to Erin, including investment income, would range from 
approximately $7,307.00 per month in 1990 to approximately 
$9,224.00 per month in 1993 and beyond. Id. Erin submitted 
absolutely no evidence to contradict Mr. Abold's testimony. 
At the end of trial, the trial court concluded that the 
alimony should decline after three years and terminate after six 
years, based upon the court's finding that Erin "will earn 
substantial income from assets that have been awarded to her and 
which will by the time three (3) years have passed, be substan-
tially in her possession or under her control and she will be able 
to invest these assets in such a way as to produce income for her 
own support." R.O.A. 382. Clearly, Mr. Abold's testimony 
supported the order that alimony be gradually reduced and then 
eliminated. By saying so, the trial court would have complied with 
this Court's mandate. By not saying so, the trial court deviated 
from the directions on remand. 
Furthermore, the trial court's new findings on remand are not 
based on the evidence at trial or any subsequent evidentiary 
hearing. At the hearing on remand, the trial court specifically 
determined that an evidentiary hearing on the alimony and attor-
neys' fees issues was not necessary, stating: "the Court has heard 
the evidence and the record is available to me." Hr. (6/7/93) 54-
55, 57-58. Therefore, the trial court should have limited its 
research to a consultation of the trial transcripts and exhibits. 
The trial court did not do so. Instead, it seized upon unsubstan-
tiated and unproven assumptions outside the record. 
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Most notably, the trial court speculated that Erin's potential 
income should be calculated by "[f]iguring a 4% return on [Erin's] 
investment base." R.O.A. 926-927. Where is the evidence to 
support that assumption? Certainly not in the testimony and 
documents introduced into evidence at trial. Apparently, the trial 
court accepted at face value the arguments of Erin's attorney on 
remand that a rate between three and one-half percent (3.5%) and 
four and one-half percent (4.5%) was more realistic than the eight 
percent (8%) which was uncontroverted at trial.5 R.O.A. 685-686. 
Where the admissible evidence is not in conflict, it is reversible 
error for the trial court to make contrary findings. See English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
The portion of the Order on Remand extending the alimony 
indefinitely was also based, in part, on the trial court's 
erroneous belief that Erin's investment base had been eroded by 
attorneys' fees and costs, taxes, and the "uncollectible11 family 
loans discussed above. As also discussed above, the trial court's 
belief that the family loans were "uncollectible" is neither 
supported by logic nor by the evidence. See discussion supra pp. 
14-17. With respect to taxes, the evidence presented at trial 
already took into consideration the tax effect on Erin's investment 
base. Tr. Ill: 93-96. The trial court also allowed Erin an offset 
for the tax liability on the alimony payments when it re-calculated 
5In fact, Erin's own expert at trial, Merrill R. Norman, a CPA 
and financial analyst, testified that he assumed an interest rate 
3f eight percent (8%) on an investment of the annuities. Tr. I: 
L00-101. 
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Erin's alimony award on remand. R.O.A. 732, 923-924. The subject 
of attorneys' fees and costs is dealt with infra at Section III. 
Finally, the trial court based its decision that the alimony 
should not terminate upon its finding that Tom had the "ability to 
provide on-going assistance." R.O.A. 926-927. In its Order on 
Remand, the trial court states that it previously ordered termina-
tion of the alimony based on the fact that, when Tom is through 
with basketball, his ability to produce income will be no better 
than Erin's. Ifi. The trial court further states that it forgot to 
take into consideration Tom's interim income and larger investment 
base, and concludes that Erin should receive on-going alimony 
because Tom will be able to afford it. id. The trial court's 
reasoning and recollection of the record in this regard are both 
unsound. 
In point of fact, in its original Findings of Fact, the trial 
court stated that "[t]he reason that the alimony should decline 
after three (3) years and terminate after six (6) years, is based 
upon the finding by the court that [Erin] will earn substantial 
income from assets that have been awarded to her." R.O.A. 383. 
Thus, the trial court previously ordered termination of the alimony 
because the evidence showed Erin would not need alimony after six 
years, not because of Tom's ability (or inability) to continue to 
generate future earnings. The courts have consistently reversed 
alimony awards that appeared to be designed to equalize disparity 
in the parties' respective post-decree income levels rather than 
merely providing supplementary income necessary to meet the 
recipient's living expense need. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 
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n.3 (Utah App. 1990); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1083 (Utah 
1988) (J. Hove, concurring and dissenting)• 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in failing to specify 
the evidentiary basis for its determination that alimony would 
terminate after six years and compounded that error by hypothe-
sizing reasons for extending spousal support payments indefinitely. 
III. The Trial Court/s Award of Attorneys' Fees to Erin Despite its 
Finding of No Need Was Error. 
Before trial, the parties stipulated that Tom would make an 
advance payment to Erin of $12,500.00 for attorneys' fees, subject 
to adjustment at the time of the final decree and distribution. 
R.O.A. 98, 393-394. At trial, Erin's counsel presented an 
affidavit reciting that $58,000.00 had or would be incurred by Erin 
for legal services. Tr. II: 160-162; Plaintiff's Exh. 17. Even 
though the trial court found that "there is probably adequate money 
being distributed to both parties to pay their own attorneys' 
fees,11 it decided that Tom should pay Erin an additional $10,000.00 
for attorneys' fees, "in view of the sums of money that Mr. 
Chambers is going to be making over the next few years.11 R.O.A. 
393-394, 411. Both parties appealed the trial court's award of a 
partial reimbursement of attorneys' fees to Erin. R.O.A. 415, 426. 
This Court held that the award of attorneys' fees was an abuse 
of discretion, because the trial court did not address the 
reasonableness of the fees and stopped short of finding that each 
party would have the means to pay their own counsel. Op. at 5. It 
reversed the award and remanded the issue for express consideration 
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of the three elements outlined in Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 493 
(Utah App. 1991). Id. 
In considering the first two elements on remand, the trial 
court found that the amount of the attorneys' fees requested by 
Erin was "not unreasonable" and that Tom had the ability to assist 
Erin in paying attorneys' fees. R.O.A. 734, 927-928. The trial 
court further stated: 
The final prong of the "Bell" (810 P2d 489) analysis 
relates to the ability of the Plaintiff to pay her own 
attorneys' fees. It is clear with the distribution of 
almost a million and a half dollars in assets, that the 
Plaintiff could pay her own attorney. However the court 
was concerned about the necessity of her being able to 
maintain an appropriate investment base. I was aware 
that there would be substantial inroads into that base by 
reason of taxes, the debt owed by her family (which is 
likely uncollectible), court costs, witness' fees, 
attorneys' fees, etc. In the interest of her being able 
to maintain a base sufficient to provide an appropriate 
income, I felt she needed some assistance with the fees. 
I ruled the attorneys' fees previously paid have been 
paid with marital assets not to be considered in the 
final distribution, and awarded her an additional $10,000 
to apply to her attorneys' fees. Based upon the above 
considerations I find that the Plaintiff has need of 
assistance with her attorneys' fees. 
R.O.A. 735-736 (emphasis added); see also R.O.A. 928, 930. 
The trial court thus concluded on remand that Erin needed 
assistance with her attorneys' fees only because it believed taxes, 
family loans and legal expenses had made "substantial inroads" into 
her investment base. As established in the preceding sections of 
this brief, there is no evidence that the family loans were 
uncollectible, there is no evidence to establish the legal expenses 
actually paid by Erin (even making the assumption that this would 
be a relevant factor) and there is uncontroverted evidence that 
taxes were already taken into consideration by the expert who 
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calculated Erin's investment income. Thus, the trial court erred 
in its conclusion that Erin's investment base was eroded. 
There is no finding by the trial court that the attorneys' 
fees she incurred would prevent her from maintaining an appropriate 
level of investment income. To the contrary, on remand, the trial 
court stated: "Tilt is clear with the distribution of almost a 
million and a half dollars in assets, that Plaintiff could pay her 
own attorney.•• R.O.A. 735, 928 (emphasis added). There can be no 
award of attorneys' fees without a showing of financial need. Kerr 
v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980); Kallas v. Kallas. 614 
P.2d 641, 646 (Utah 1980). Therefore, the award of attorneys' fees 
to Erin must be reversed, and the trial court should be specific-
ally directed to order Erin to reimburse the previous payments with 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above, Tom requests that the Order 
on Remand be reversed in part, with the following instructions on 
remand: (1) that the trial court be directed to order Erin to 
reimburse Tom for overpayments of alimony in the amount of $108,000 
plus interest; (2) that the trial court be directed to reinstate 
its original order terminating alimony payments after six years; 
and (3) that the trial court be directed to reverse its award of 
attorneys' fees to Erin and order Erin to reimburse Tom for 
previous payments in the amount of $22,500 plus interest. In all 
other respects, the Order on Remand and the Decree should be 
affirmed. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERIN JO CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS D* CHAMBERS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER ON REMAND *t ^  % 
Civil No- 890901927 
Hon. Stanton M. Taylor 
BACKGROUND 
On October 21, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals filed 
its decision on the earlier appeal of this case. See 
Chambers v. Chambers. 198 U.A.R. 49 (Utah App. 1992). 
After remand, the matter was placed on the Court's 
calendar for a scheduling conference for January 19, 1993. 
The parties, through their respective counsel, appeared 
before the Court on that day, at which time the defendant, 
through his counsel, filed with the Court a Memorandum on 
Remand and proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro 
Tung. Defendant's Memorandum contended that sufficient 
evidence existed in the record to support supplemental 
Findings, Conclusions and Amended Decree of Divorce and that 
no further hearing should be necessary. 
The Court gave plaintiff additional time to respond to 
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defendant's Memorandum and provisionally scheduled the matter 
for trial on June 24, 1993. 
On February 17, 1993, the plaintiff, through her 
counsel, filed a Response to Memorandum and thereafter the 
Court scheduled a hearing for argument which was held 
June 7, 1993. The parties, through their respective counsel, 
presented their positions. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Court announced that it felt sufficient facts existed in 
the record to permit the Court to supplement its findings in 
conformance with the directions of the Court of Appeals, 
canceled the trial date and took the matter under advisement. 
On July 9, 1993, the Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision. 
On July 13, 1993, the plaintiff, through her counsel, 
asked the Court for some further clarification with respect 
to its decision, which clarification was provided by letter 
from the Court dated July 16, 1993. 
On September 15, 1993, the parties' counsel met with 
the Court requesting additional clarification regarding the 
effective date of the reduction of alimony. The Court took 
that matter under further advisement and issued its 
Supplemental Memorandum on November 19, 1993. 
With this background, the Court now enters the 
following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this 
case to this Court outlining three areas for the Court's 
reconsideration. Those three areas were alimony, division of 
retirement and an award of attorney fees. 
2. In this case, there is no question that in 
considering the preferences established in Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the facts would favor a 
present division of the retirement because the present value 
is determinable and there are sufficient assets in the estate 
to allow such a division. The Court has personally felt that 
there should be a strong preference favoring a division which 
would assure a non-working spouse with a secure independent 
retirement income, but the Court defers to the wisdom and law 
established by Woodward. 
3. In reconsidering the alimony award in the original 
Decree, it occurs that there were miscalculations. 
4. Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 correctly reflected the 
needs of the plaintiff and her children at about $10,000.00 
per month. That amount failed to consider her additional 
need of health and accident insurance (previously provided by 
the defendant) and money to offset her tax liability for her 
receipt of alimony. 
5. The Court recognized there were substantial 
v hd x) 
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children's expenses involved in the Exhibit 11 needs 
assessment, but those expenses would be approximately offset 
by the fact that the child support nearly equalled the amount 
of children's expense alleged on Exhibit 11 and the $4,500.00 
child support was included in the income calculations. 
6. In recalculating the alimony, if the Court accepts 
the expenses of Exhibit 11 and adds the expenses of health 
and accident insurance and taxes on the alimony paid and then 
deducts the child support, that means the plaintiff has need 
of about $7,000.00 to maintain her prior standard of living. 
7. The estimated $7,000.00 for the plaintiff to 
maintain her prior standard of living does not factor into 
any consideration of the plaintiff's ability to provide for 
herself or money received as returns on investments from 
assets awarded to her as part of the property division. 
8. It was the intent of the Court that the plaintiff 
should have the initial three years as a rehabilitative 
period to: 
A. Martial her assets; 
B. Learn to invest appropriately; 
C. Make decisions about her future; 
D. Prepare for future employment; 
E. Become settled, etc. 
9. In the Court's reconsideration of alimony in the 
*' ** •* 
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Memorandum Decision issued July 9, 1993, the Court failed to 
specify the disposition of the over-payment of alimony from 
the time of the original Decree to the Order of the Court of 
Appeals. Upon reflection, that failure may have been a 
result of a subconscious desire to not address the issues in 
hopes it would go away. To require the plaintiff to repay 
those over-payments would seriously affect her ability to 
maintain her standard of living. It would undermine further 
her investment base to a very serious extent. In addition, 
in dividing the estate, we had awarded to her an obligation 
of her family which at this point seems unlikely to be 
collected. The decision to loan the money to plaintiff's 
brother appears to have been a joint decision. The 
diminution of her estate by both the loan and repayment of 
alimony based on the Court's mistake, somehow seems unfair. 
10. Plaintiff was thirty years of age at the time of 
trial. She testified that she had two and one-half years of 
college and that she held certain jobs previously, including 
teaching dancing, working in window display and as a clerk at 
ZCMI and a clerk at Stop & Shop. She also testified she 
helped manage some apartments. Plaintiff also testified that 
she had not made any attempts to obtain any employment 
outside of the house. The evidence also showed that 
plaintiff participated in many types of physical activities 
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and there were no reasons, health or otherwise, why plaintiff 
could not be fully employed and contribute to her own needs. 
Plaintiff could have found appropriate employment which would 
provide at least a minimum wage income of $736.00 to assist 
in providing her own needs. 
11. The plaintiff received as her share of the 
property division $1,479,578.00. Realistically, it would not 
be fair to consider that figure as her investment base. 
There were obviously attorney fees and costs of the 
proceeding, as well as taxes to pay, etc. The plaintiff has 
requested that we deduct from her investment base her 
purchase of a home and the debt to her from her family. 
12. It would not be appropriate to allow the plaintiff 
to remove the home from her investment base and also allow 
her to claim rent expense of over $1,000.00 per month. 
13. The Court figures with a four percent return on 
her investment base, the imputed income of $736.00 and the 
child support, the alimony should be reduced at the end of 
three years to $3,000.00 per month. 
14* The Court previously ordered the alimony to be 
terminated at the end of six years. That decision was based 
on the fact that when the defendant was through with 
basketball, his ability to produce income is frankly no 
better than the plaintiffs and his present earning ability is 
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based strictly upon his status as a professional athlete. 
15. In retrospect, that is not entirely correct or it 
fails to consider the income he will earn in the meantime. 
His investment base, considering his interim income, should 
exceed the plaintiff's by several times, giving him by far a 
superior ability to provide on-going assistance. 
16. The final issue requiring consideration is that of 
the attorney fee award. The stipulation at trial, as the 
Court understood it, was that if Mr. Dolowitz were called to 
testify, he would verify the material contained in 
plaintiff's Exhibit 17 and express the opinion that the time 
and costs involved were reasonable taking into account the 
complexity and seriousness of the issues involved. The 
defendant did not stipulate the charges or time were 
reasonable, but only that Mr. Dolowitz would testify 
accordingly. 
17. Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 contained a summary sheet 
of the gross charges, a breakdown of the hourly rate of 
persons from Mr. Dolowitz's office working on the plaintiff's 
case, a monthly summary of charges, times and persons and 
finally a day-by-day account of date, attorney, service 
description, hours and charge. 
18. In considering the complexity of issues, the 
number of hearings, the conferences, the resolution of 
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issues, the animosity between the parties, the amounts of 
money and property, the Court believes the attorney fee 
charges were not unreasonable. 
19. An additional issue relating to attorney fees is 
the fact that the defendant with a multi-million dollar 
income clearly has the ability to assist the plaintiff with 
her attorney fees and in comparison of the resources of the 
two parties, he is in a much superior position. 
20. The final prong of the test established in Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) relates to the ability of 
the plaintiff to pay her own attorney fees. It is clear with 
the distribution of almost a million and one-half dollars in 
assets, the plaintiff could pay her own attorney. However, 
the Court was concerned about the necessity of her being able 
to maintain an appropriate investment base. The Court was 
aware that there would be substantial inroad into that base 
by reason of taxes, the debt owed by her family which is 
likely uncollectible, court costs, witness fees, attorney 
fees, etc* 
21. In the interest of the plaintiff being able to 
maintain a base sufficient to provide an appropriate income, 
she has need of some assistance with her attorney fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. The defendant is awarded all of his NBA or 
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basketball related retirements subject to paying the 
plaintiff one-half of the value in existence at the time of 
the original divorce trial. The value of the NBA Players 
Pension Plan presented at the time of trial was $64,758.92, 
one-half of which would belong to the plaintiff ($32,379.46). 
2. In addition, in the past there have been 
enhancements to the plan having retroactive effect. If 
enhancements have occurred since the time of the trial of 
this matter, plaintiff shall be entitled to her share of any 
such enhancements based on the Woodward formula. This shall 
apply to any retirements existing at the time of the trial of 
this matter. 
3. A minimum wage income of $736.00 per month should 
be imputed to the plaintiff. 
4. Based on the findings concerning the plaintiff/s 
return on her investment base, her imputed income as stated 
above and the child support previously stipulated to and 
ordered, plaintiff's alimony should be reduced to $7,000.00 
per month effective with the Court's Memorandum Decision 
dated July 12, 1993, which shall continue for the balance of 
the three-year rehabilitative period, after which the alimony 
should be reduced to $3,000.00 per month. 
5. The alimony awarded herein should only terminate 
upon the occurrence of remarriage, death or operation of law. 
*• ~ & 
•LORENCE 
AND 
UTCHISON 
PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
l i t • 2fTil STREET 
OCDEN. ITTAII S440I 
CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS 
Civil No. 890901927 
Findings, Conclusions, Order 
Page No. 10 
6. Based on the findings above and the standards 
established in Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991), 
the $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at the time of trial 
is hereby affirmed. 
ORDER 
The Court having issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant be and he is hereby 
awarded all of his NBA or basketball related retirements 
subject to paying the plaintiff one-half of the value in 
existence at the time of the original divorce trial. The 
value of the NBA Players Pension Plan presented at the time 
of trial was $64,758.92, one-half of which would belong to 
the plaintiff ($32,379.46). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition, in the past 
there have been enhancements to the plan having retroactive 
effect. If enhancements have occurred since the time of the 
trial of this matter, plaintiff shall be entitled to her 
share of any such enhancements based on the Woodward formula. 
This shall apply to any retirements existing at the time of 
the trial of this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a minimum wage income of 
$736.00 per month shall be imputed to the plaintiff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the findings 
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concerning the plaintiff's return on her investment base, her 
imputed income as stated above and the child support 
previously stipulated to and ordered, plaintiff's alimony 
shall be reduced to $7,000.00 per month effective with the 
Court's Memorandum Decision dated July 12, 1993, which shall 
continue for the balance of the three-year rehabilitative 
period, after which the alimony shall be reduced to $3,000.00 
per month. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the alimony awarded herein 
shall only terminate upon the occurrence of remarriage, death 
or operation of law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the findings above 
and the standards established in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 
(Utah App. 1991), the $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at 
the time of trial is hereby affirmed. 
this K/ day of March, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
STANTOti/M. 
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF 
TO DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS COUNSEL: 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, you are hereby notified that the undersigned 
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will hold the original hereof for a period of five days from 
the date this notice is mailed to you to allow you sufficient 
time to file any written objections to the form of the 
foregoing with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. 
If no objections to the form are filed within that time, the 
original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature 
and filing. , 
DATED this£2ifL_ day of January, 1994. 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Remand, postage prepaid, to the following at the 
addresses listed on this ,<7^)—"day of January, 1994. 
Pete K. Vlahos 
Attorney for Defendant 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Mark J. Robens 
Attorney for Defendant 
2901 N. Central Avenue #200 
Phoenix, AZ^ £5012 
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